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Abstract 
The idea of lingual economy 
A number of philosophical concepts in linguistics may be 
conceptualised as primitives or founding concepts. Many of 
these are historically significant; cf. the concepts lingual system; 
lingual position and sequence, lingual constancy. Less obvious 
primitives are ideas of spheres of discourse, text type and ac-
ceptability. Generally, such foundational notions may be cha-
racterised either as constitutive concepts or as regulative ideas. 
This article will discuss one such regulative linguistic idea, viz. 
lingual economy, especially as this was articulated in the work 
of the ethnomethodologists on turn-taking. Like many other 
linguistic primitives, this idea constitutes a significant advance 
in our understanding of things lingual. The analyses referred to 
below give insight into the normative dimensions of our com-
municative ability to function as lingual subjects within the 
material lingual sphere of conversation. These analyses con-
stitute an advance on earlier analyses of conversation, where 
the overall impression is that it is “random”, forever edging 
towards indeterminacy and chaos. We may currently build upon 
the remarkable explanations, first given by ethnomethodology, 
for lingual distribution, equality, lingually scarce resource, and 
so forth. The article will argue that these relate to significant 
regulative ideas that disclose the structure of the lingual 
dimension of reality. 
Opsomming 
Die idee van ’n linguale ekonomie 
’n Aantal filosofiese begrippe in die taalkunde kan gekon-
septualiseer word as “primitiewe” of grondbegrippe. Sulke be-
grippe is gewoonlik histories betekenisvol: vergelyk die kon-
septe linguale sisteem, posisie en konstantheid, asook die 
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linguale idees van diskoerstipe, tekstipe en aanvaarbaarheid. 
Ons kan sulke nosies as konstitutiewe begrippe of regulatiewe 
idees beskou. Hierdie artikel handel oor die regulatiewe idee 
van linguale ekonomie, en die hantering daarvan in die werk 
van die etnometodoloë oor beurtwisseling. Soos in die geval 
van ander linguistiese primitiewe, dra hierdie idee betekenisvol 
by tot ons begrip van die linguale. Die artikel verwys na 
analises wat insig gee in die normatiewe dimensies van ons 
kommunikatiewe vermoë om as linguale subjekte op te tree in 
die sfeer van gesprekvoering. Hierdie analises neem ons veel 
verder as vroeëre analises wat geïmpliseer het dat gesprekke 
deur hulle lukraak koers gekenmerk word, en altyd maar op die 
rand van chaos beweeg. Hulle maak dit moontlik om voort te 
bou op die merkwaardige verklarings van onder andere linguale 
distribusie, gelykheid en skaarste waarvoor die etnometodoloë 
ons oë oopgemaak het. Die artikel argumenteer dat hierdie 
regulatiewe linguistiese idees die struktuur van die linguale 
aspek van die werklikheid betekenisvol vir ons ontsluit. 
1. Linguistic primitives 
This article conceptualises linguistic primitives as belonging to a 
class of foundational theoretical concepts in linguistics. Since they 
are characterised as foundational concepts, this means that they 
are, in essence, founding concepts of the discipline, and in that 
sense, philosophical. Though they refer to concepts used within the 
discipline of linguistics, they derive at least part of their meaning 
from some coherent foundational or philosophical framework. This 
article utilises the philosophical framework developed by Dooye-
weerd (1953), and especially his idea that reality has a modal 
horizon that allows our theoretical analysis to conceptualise a multi-
plicity of unique, mutually irreducible, yet interconnected aspects. By 
viewing these modalities as irreducible but interconnected, Dooye-
weerd’s approach in principle avoids the reductionist pitfalls that 
impede theoretical concept formation whenever one mode of reality 
is absolutised, and all others are subsumed under it. 
In linguistics, there is a long line of investigation that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, has attempted to utilise this framework by showing 
how the lingual mode of experience, which defines the field of in-
vestigation of linguistics, coheres or analogically reflects all the other 
aspects of reality: the numerical, spatial, kinematic, physical, orga-
nic, sensitive, logical, formative, social, economic, aesthetic, juri-
dical, ethical and confessional. The analogical connections of the 
lingual aspect with earlier (foundational or constitutive) and later 
(regulative) aspects yield, upon analysis, a number of linguistic pri-
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mitives. In a recent analysis done in terms of such a framework 
(Weideman, 2008), I have, following Hommes (1972) and others (De 
Jongste, 1949; 1956; Verburg, 1951; 1965; 1971; 1976; Strauss, 
1967; 1970; 1971; Yallop, 1978; Weideman, 1981; Bakker, 1984) 
and contrary in some respects to, for example, Hoogland (2005:36) 
and Visagie (2006:202), presented a foundational articulation of 
various such linguistic primitives or elementary systematic concepts 
of linguistic theory. 
The further starting point of this article is that such systematic 
concepts are closely linked with the history of the discipline. Many of 
these are of significant historical interest: compare, for example, the 
notion of lingual system (as in work from De Saussure to Chomsky); 
that of lingual position and sequence (as in structuralist linguistics); 
and the concepts of lingual constancy and movement (as in trans-
formational grammar). Less obvious, perhaps, but equally important 
are notions of lingual spheres of discourse, text type and lingual 
acceptability that normally fall within the purview of the linguistic 
subdisciplines of pragmatics, discourse analysis and text linguistics. 
Such systematically and historically important and influential con-
cepts are related to the coherence between the lingual dimension of 
reality, which delimits the field of study of the discipline of linguistics 
(Weideman, 1981; 2008), and other aspects of reality, such as the 
numerical, the spatial, the kinematic, the logical, the formative, the 
social, and so forth. For example, the notion of lingual system that 
De Saussure (1966) was so influential in identifying, articulates the 
coherence between the lingual and the numerical: a system of 
lingual norms is a unity within a multiplicity of norms. Similarly, the 
factual position and sequence of lingual elements, as this was 
explicated in the work of the structuralists, provides evidence of the 
connection between the lingual and the spatial dimensions of our 
world. The notion of lingual constancy (and also the regular po-
sitional movement of lingual elements) is an analogy that lies at the 
heart of transformational grammar, and relates to the link between 
the lingual dimension of reality and the kinematic. No doubt, similar 
analogical concepts may be discovered in other, more recent ap-
proaches to linguistic conceptualisation. Cognitive linguistics (Lang-
acker, 1987; 1991; Dirven & Verspoor, 1998), though by its own 
admission an approach that is not part of mainstream linguistics 
(Langacker, 1987:v), is one such approach that echoes many of the 
concerns that are articulated in the foundational framework that I 
have been working from. Apart from its concerns with “the 
conceptual clarification of fundamental issues” (Langacker, 1987:1), 
its attention to the notions of expressive (lingual) extension (space) 
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and how we perceive and cognitively process objective lingual facts 
in terms of semantics and syntax is without doubt of importance to a 
foundational linguistic analysis. A similar case can be made for the 
importance of systemic functional grammar (SFG), that builds upon 
the work of Halliday (1985). The insights of SFG form a very 
important bridge across a major fault line in linguistic theory also 
oriented to in cognitive linguistics – that between formal linguistics 
and sociolinguistic analyses. As will become clear below, the focus 
of this article of necessity has to exclude a serious and separate 
treatment of such approaches if one is to do justice to them. Simi-
larly, the minimalist turn that transformational grammar has taken 
(Chomsky, 1995), though ostensibly concerned with notions of eco-
nomy and simplicity as conditions for universal grammar (Chomsky, 
1995:168-171) may be of interest in that respect, but fall outside the 
scope of this article. 
Generally, such foundational notions as are placed in the theoretical 
spotlight by the analysis of the analogical link between the lingual 
and other experiential aspects may be characterised either as con-
stitutive concepts or as regulative ideas. The examples of the links 
or analogies between the lingual and the aspects preceding it that 
are given in the previous paragraph belong to the set of elementary 
linguistic concepts. In that sense the numerical, spatial and kine-
matic aspects are “earlier” aspects than the lingual, and such con-
cepts are, by that token, constitutive. Those connections between 
the lingual dimension of reality and the aspects following it, on the 
other hand, are elementary linguistic ideas or limiting – in the sense 
of transcending – concepts. Since the social, economic, juridical and 
ethical dimensions of reality are subsequent or “later” aspects in re-
lation to the lingual, a systematic investigation of their coherence 
with the lingual will only be able to grasp that linkage in terms of a 
set of anticipatory moments, or a set of limiting concepts or re-
gulative ideas. If we take as a final example the analysis of the so-
cial anticipations in the structure of the lingual aspect (an analysis 
that yields a linguistic idea), we encounter notions of lingual spheres 
of discourse, each with their own normative requirements that 
variously determine the factual lingual text types that operate within 
them, and ideas of lingual acceptability within a differentiated num-
ber of spheres of discourse (cf. Weideman, 2008: Chapter 14). 
A third assumption that this article makes, and will seek to illustrate 
in the analysis that is offered, is that constitutive elementary lin-
guistic concepts and regulative linguistic ideas are interdependent. 
In the development of a systematic linguistic methodology, the in-
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vestigation of constitutive linguistic concepts must be complemented 
both by an enquiry into regulative linguistic ideas, and by a sys-
tematic linguistic analysis of the various complex linguistic concepts. 
Moreover, the conceptual understanding of one set of such linkages 
or analogies is not really possible without either implicit or 
sometimes explicit reference to other analogies. 
Among the limiting concepts that should be reviewed in such an 
investigation are the linguistic ideas of normative and factual lingual 
economy (Hjelmslev [1963:94 ff.] includes in this respect the pheno-
mena of aposiopesis, abbreviation and catalysis), factual and nor-
mative lingual harmony, lingual accountability, lingual integrity and 
lingual trust. These are ideas that link the lingual aspect to the 
economic, aesthetic, juridical, moral and confessional aspects of 
experience. 
The analysis that I offer in Weideman (2008) illustrates, I believe, 
that the analogical connections between the lingual aspect of our 
experience and the other temporal modalities yield not a single ana-
logy to be analysed, but normally offer a whole set of retrocipations 
(in the case of constitutive analogical moments) or anticipations 
(analogies looking forward to the relationship of the lingual modality 
with those aspects following it in the temporal order). As I have 
pointed out above, while the former are analysable in terms of 
theoretical concepts, the latter connections are conceptually clarified 
in terms of linguistic limiting concepts or ideas. 
The main purpose of the current article is therefore to take an ele-
ment of a linguistic limiting concept, that of lingual economy, further 
along the analytical track that has been indicated by the systematic 
framework briefly described above. As will be shown, the notion of 
lingual economy cannot be understood without reference to other 
analogical relations or sets of relations, but in fact deepens the 
systematic exploration of these. In a very specific sense, the idea of 
lingual economy that will be systematically articulated below 
enhances our understanding of the social disclosure of language in 
different material lingual spheres, which is discussed in detail in 
Weideman (2008: Chapters 4 and 14). The regulative idea of a lin-
gual economy, in which the lingual aspect of experience anticipates 
the economic dimension, is mediated, in fact, through such social 
anticipations or analogies within the lingual aspect. Although the 
current discussion also contains new references to some of the 
critiques of the work on the idea of a lingual economy that will be 
discussed below, I shall freely use the material and analyses that 
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are discussed in a broader context and detail in Weideman (2008: 
Chapter 15). 
2. The idea of lingual economy 
There are naturally all kinds of intuitive and practical everyday no-
tions associated with the idea of lingual economy. One may think, 
for example, of judgments we make of an interlocutor’s loqua-
ciousness or taciturnity, or of the more intellectually sophisticated 
assessments we might make of the economy of expression that is 
associated with certain forms of verbal art, in particular poetry, which 
achieves a remarkable density through its utilisation of a number of 
lingual and other symbolic resources. 
Then there is of course the further temptation to conceive of the 
analogical modal link between the lingual dimension of our expe-
rience and the economic dimension of reality in terms of the con-
crete phenomenon of language and its role in the sphere of eco-
nomic life, in other words in the world of trade, commerce and 
financial transactions. These are no doubt interesting issues. The 
way that language acts as barrier to commerce and trade, or the 
way in which economic considerations influence the power that 
some languages gain on a global scale, while others stand to lose, 
are complex issues that are studied within the realm of language 
management or planning, as well as in language politics, and are 
therefore more properly treated in these subfields of applied lin-
guistics (or in development economics, as Van Langevelde, 1997 
and 1999 have done for Friesland and minority regions). I would 
argue that, for systematic reasons, the analysis of these phenomena 
be postponed until we have come to a better conceptual under-
standing of the elementary linguistic concepts that concern the 
abstract modal relationships between these two dimensions. This 
does not mean that they have a lower conceptual or theoretical 
status; quite the contrary: such concrete issues are much more 
complex, and the problems that they throw up need deliberate and 
sustained attention, and are worthy of consideration from a multi-
plicity of perspectives. 
Instead, I propose to set out below a single illustration of how, in the 
theoretical approach known as ethnomethodology (cf. Sacks, et al., 
1974; Goffman, 1981; Sacks, 1984; Schegloff, 1992; 2001; Heritage 
& Atkinson, 1984; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), a breakaway school of 
sociology, we find a theoretically exceptional treatment of the idea of 
lingual economy. Their analyses enlighten us as regards the won-
derfully complicated nature of lingual interaction when our theore-
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tical view ventures beyond the consideration of the expressive 
kernel of the lingual modality to an analysis of the structuredness of 
the shared expression or communication that lingual subjects at-
tempt every day. The analysis engages here with a social analogy 
within the structure of the lingual aspect. If shared expression or 
communication provides the starting point for this analysis, it 
situates the lingual facts that are brought into view squarely within 
the social domain, or what I have been calling the social anti-
cipations of the lingual aspect. That, in turn, immediately places 
spoken interaction in the theoretical spotlight. In pointing out the 
differences between Grice’s (1975) “theory-driven” methodology and 
that of the “data-driven” approach of the ethnomethodologists, 
Svennevig (2001) is correct in observing that our 
claims about spoken interaction are based on theoretical 
primitives (such as meaning, rationality and communication). 
These primitives indeed are foundational linguistic concepts that 
express the connections between the lingual dimension, and, 
respectively, the logical aspect of experience (in the concepts of 
factual lingual identity, rationality or meaning) and the social (lingual 
expression that is shared with others to deepen into com-
munication). However, we should also acknowledge that the eth-
nomethodological articulation of the idea of a lingual economy 
operating in spoken interaction proceeds from just such a primitive 
or foundational linguistic idea, in this case the anticipation by the 
lingual of the economic aspect of reality. In the illustration of lingual 
economy that will be dealt with below, lingual economy will be 
conceptualised as a factual scarcity of a lingual resource – a turn at 
talk – that is resolved, especially in one form of talk, conversation, 
with reference to its more or less equal distribution through the 
orientation that we have to a normative lingual system for sharing or 
distributing such a resource. In this formulation, the idea of lingual 
economy refers to what one reviewer has called the capitalist notion 
of economy (scarcity) and the socialist idea of achieving (equitable) 
distribution. The system of turn-taking that will be referred to below 
thus encapsulates both scarcity and distribution. 
In the illustration that follows, I shall freely use some earlier material 
and analyses that I have made individually or in collaboration with 
others (Weideman, 1984; 1985; 1988; Weideman, et al., 1986; 
Weideman & Verster, 1988). 
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3. A system for lingual sharing 
The analyses that the school of ethnomethodology made have been 
particularly useful for us in gaining insight into the normative dimen-
sions of our communicative ability to function as lingual subjects 
within the material lingual sphere of conversation. These insights, I 
shall argue, have taken us much further than the initial, preliminary 
analyses of Crystal and Davy (1976), where the overall impression 
is that conversation is “random”, forever edging towards indeter-
minacy and chaos. Most of the examples cited in this early study are 
of a lexical and syntactic nature; that is, they use factual lingual units 
at word and sentence level. 
We should note, however, that once we take the study of human 
lingual competence and action beyond the notion of grammatical 
competence, other considerations emerge, and other levels of lin-
gual object formation come into play. Thus it is with the analysis of 
conversation. Far from being random and indeterminate, con-
versation analyses have shown such talk to have a remarkably tight 
and economical organisation. 
Central to this analysis is the idea of turn-taking in conversation. It is 
of course true that the lingual economy that is effected by means of 
turn-taking among those sharing in communicative interaction is not 
limited to conversation. Conversation is only one form of talk: that 
which is conducted among equals in an associative relationship. In 
most forms of talk, done within the various material lingual spheres 
of discourse that are referred to in Weideman (2008), some nor-
mative system of turn-taking is indeed operative. Take for example 
the allocation of turns at talk in a classroom, that has been inves-
tigated by Greyling (1987; cf. too Coulthard, 1985; Duff, 2002; 
Storch, 2004; Arthur & Martin, 2006) and others. Such is the in-
equality in this form of institutional talk that in conventional class-
rooms the teacher normally occupies two-thirds of this scarce re-
source, in initiating a typical exchange by eliciting information, and 
ending it by giving feedback to the learner’s response. Similarly, in 
ecclesiastical settings, which make up another institutional context, 
there may be predetermined and liturgically or ritually specified 
measures of how turns at talk are distributed. Parliamentary debates 
(cf. Shaw, 2000) and courtroom discourse provide further examples 
of institutional lingual interaction, and there have even been studies 
of how audience applause – a non-verbal, but certainly lingually 
meaningful action – in all kinds of settings is both allowed, elicited 
and achieved (cf. Levinson, 1983:301). 
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For conversation analysts, however, the central problem was to 
explain how participants at talk manage in a lingual context that is 
associational, that is a context in which there is neither accepted 
authority, nor a more or less durable relationship between the 
members – durable referring here to the possibility of the relation-
ship lapsing when a member (terminally) falls away, unlike in in-
stitutional relationships, that have a durability beyond the coming 
and going of individual members. How, in a relationship that is cha-
racterised rather by equality between participants, do they manage a 
lingually economical, and to bring in a juridical analogy as well, fair 
way of distributing access to a scarce lingual resource: a turn at 
talk? What lingual subjects in the communicative event that we call 
conversation need, is, as Levinson (1983:297) puts it: 
… a sharing device, an ‘economy’ operating over a scarce re-
source, namely control of the ‘floor’. Such an allocational sys-
tem will require minimal units (or ‘shares’) over which it will 
operate, such units being the units from which turns are 
constructed. 
The idea of turn-taking as a set of norms or a system of lingual 
economy is so deceptively obvious that, before the advent of 
ethnomethodological analyses, very little attention had been paid to 
it. Of course, like many other theoretical ideas, the idea of a turn-
taking system that is operative in conversation has been strongly 
contested (for example by O’Connell et al., 1990; Cowley, 1998), but 
these either proceed from a misunderstanding of the methodological 
and procedural starting points of conversation analysis (cf. for 
example Sacks, 1984; Schegloff, 1992; 2001) or misrepresent both 
the positions and the claims made by ethnomethodologists. What is 
important, however, is neither their contestation nor the theoretical 
endurance of these ideas in spite of their being challenged, but the 
historical significance of the insight, that opened up a dimension of 
linguistic conceptualisation that we did not have before. The earlier 
analyses of conversation referred to above failed to recognise the 
potential significance of discovering an organisational structure in 
conversation, and also the host of explanatory problems that it 
evokes. 
4. Turn-taking and conversation 
One of the hardest questions to answer, if one agrees with the 
ethnomethodologists, is why it is so that turn-taking is central to 
conversation. When we look at an actual instance of conversation, it 
is not difficult to observe that one participant talks, stops, that at that 
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point another starts, talks, stops, at which point the turn at talk is 
transferred to the first speaker, and so on. 
One possible explanation for this is that in the roughly equal (in the 
sense of recurrent) distribution of talk across the turns of different 
speakers there is evidence of the (social) equality of the speakers. 
Note that, while the notion of lingual distribution is certainly an 
articulation of an echo of the economic modality (which is originally 
concerned with the allocation of scarce resources) within the lingual 
sphere, and the idea of equality concerns the social specifications of 
the role of lingual subjects, the concept of lingual recurrence most 
probably echoes and conceptually broadens the constitutive relation 
between the lingual aspect and the kinematic. When the opportunity 
for talk is as evenly and recurrently distributed as in conversation, it 
is a way of securing, a ratification, of the equality of participants. I 
return below to the articulation of the idea of ratification or lingual 
confirmation which, in its turn, is a juridical analogy within the struc-
ture of the lingual aspect. 
To see why this explanation is plausible, we need to compare the 
relatively equal distribution of turns at talk in conversation with other 
forms of talk that were referred to above. In non-associational, in-
stitutional settings for example, there is often a marked and wide-
spread lack of an equal distribution of turns (Greyling, 1987; 
Coulthard, 1985; Arthur & Martin, 2006). The lecture is a case in 
point, for here one of the participants holds forth for almost any 
length of time, and moreover, has the ability to withhold from other 
participants any opportunity of talking, by employing a number of 
devices: “Let me just finish this point ...” is a technique often used to 
counter an interruption signal from one of the other participants, be it 
in the form of a cough, a raising of the hand, the clearing of a throat 
or any combination of these. Actually, then, it is not so much the size 
of the turn that suspends the equality of the participants, it is more 
likely the presence of an authority to allocate (or withhold allocation 
of) turns. This is probably the case in all institutional settings, even 
those where one would expect the power gradient between the 
person who has the authority to influence the allocation of turns and 
the co-participant at talk to be less steep, as in receptionist-patient 
exchanges (cf. Hewitt, 2006:142; also 34). 
The same inequality seems to reign in law courts, religious services 
and meetings, where there are either ritualised ways of allocating 
turns, or where one participant has the acknowledged right to allo-
cate turns (be such a person presiding officer of the court, chair-
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person, or whatever). There are in these types of discourse signs of 
the authority relationship that ordinary conversation lacks. 
One of the most interesting observations that follows from turn-
taking or speaker change in conversation is the remarkable lack of 
overlap between speakers. It has been calculated that less than 5% 
– a minimal amount by any standard – of talk overlaps between the 
turns of ratified speakers (Levinson, 1983:296). In the moment of 
speaker ratification, we find an echo of a juridical analogy in the lin-
gual aspect: once rightfully confirmed as speaker, and acknow-
ledged as such by co-participants at talk, a speaker has a defens-
ible, allocated space in which to speak. What is even more remark-
able about the lack of overlap between speakers is that at the same 
time gaps between speakers’ turns are almost immeasurably small – 
only a few tenths of a second, and sometimes considerably shorter. 
In spite of speaker change, talk is therefore continuous, always in 
progress. This is a significant enhancement of our understanding of 
the concept of lingual continuity, which is another linguistic primitive, 
related to the analogical link between the lingual and the spatial 
dimensions (for a more detailed discussion, cf. Weideman, 2008: 
Chapter 7). It is an illustration, once again, that the constitutive lin-
guistic concept of continuity is enlivened and developed further by 
the regulative linguistic ideas that flow from the modal interconnec-
tions between the lingual and the social, economic and juridical 
analogies, since the idea of lingual continuity is now conceived of as 
a communicative space (the turn) in which lingual subjects share 
expression or meaning in an economically moderated way that not 
only allows for the sharing of such lingual space, but rightfully 
distributes and allocates it. 
5. An orientation to norms for conversation 
How can one explain this? Conversation analysts suggest a rule to 
which speakers are subject that explains both the absence of gaps 
between turns and the simultaneous lack of overlap, i.e. the con-
tinuity of talk in conversation: 
Rule:  At least and not more than one party talks at a time 
This rule has a normative character, and does not function as a 
natural law which is inviolable. Indeed, speakers do in fact overlap 
(marked //) as in the following example from Sacks et al. (1974:702):  
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[1] Desk: What is your last name // Lorraine?  
 Caller:  Dinnis 
 Desk: What?  
 Caller: Dinnis  
        (Sacks et al., 1974:702.) 
The amount of overlap, however, either remains negligible, or can at 
least be remedied, as in the above, since both speakers know that a 
fundamental rule has been violated, and collaboratively set out to 
rectify such deviation in their first subsequent round of turns. In this 
lingual collaboration, we see another dimension of the social ana-
logies within the lingual modality. Furthermore, in the normative 
lingual orientation that co-participants in conversation have towards 
such violations, we find an illustration of the idea of lingual account-
ability – speakers set out to rectify and repair the continuity that is to 
be jointly and collaboratively achieved – which expresses in yet 
another way the anticipations within the lingual aspect of our 
experience of the juridical and social. 
That knowledge of the rule above is part of our subjective com-
municative ability or competence is also evident, firstly, in the fact 
that we know, within milliseconds apparently, that in the case of 
speakers competing for a turn one has started first. This will pro-
bably be the one who will continue while the other drops out, as in 
the example from Svartvik and Quirk (1980:47; adapted from p. 786-
797; + marks the end of overlap): 
[2]   A: ... I thought he was going to talk us into having to do 
another complete set of ... set books for that bloody 
philology // paper 
  *B:  Erm + 
  *A: If he had I’d // have said ... 
  *B: the ... the other the other the other + the other 
man ehm who ... I thought was going to get 
you wild was Potter. 
 
  *A: (swears) I’ll crown that bastard before I’m 
finished with him. 
 
   (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:47, adapted from 786-
797; + marks the end of overlap.) 
Secondly, if there is almost exactly simultaneous talk, we have 
techniques to snatch a turn or to let it go by either upgrading our 
tone and pitch, or by fading, as in 
[3]  J: But this // person that DID IT + IS GOT TO BE  
 *V:  If I see the person 
 *J: ... taken care of 
   (Levinson, 1993:301.) 
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and 
[4] A: ... It is sui generis ..., you see  
 B: Yes. 
 A: Ehm ... 
 B:  //  But I  I + 
 A: THIS IS + this is one of the things that eh one of the many 
things eh in English structure which is ehm an item in a 
close system. 
        (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:46 f.; adapted from p. 738-750.) 
However interesting these observations may be, ethnomethodology 
requires that we offer a local explanation for them. If we indeed, as 
part of our communicative competence, possess the general ability 
to recognise and act upon overlap, while striving to maintain and 
uphold the fundamental rule of talk, that at least but not more than 
one party talks at a time, then it should be obvious that we have 
some kind of system for achieving this. For if talk must normatively 
be continuous, then, given the fact of turn-taking or recurrent change 
of speaker, we must have some means of achieving such change. 
How, in other words, do we hand over turns to another in speaking? 
One obvious way of transferring a turn at talk to another lingual 
subject is by nominating the next speaker. In other kinds of talk this 
occurs frequently, cf. parliamentary debates 
[5] I now call upon the honourable member for Upington ... 
or press conferences 
[6] Mr. Jackson, from the Daily Star? 
It is, however, clear that speaker nomination has to be done much 
more delicately and subtly in conversation. It would be ludicrous if in 
conversation we are forever being formally and explicitly called upon 
to speak. And yet we are called upon to speak, and if we reflect 
upon it, are often selected as next speakers in continuing 
conversation, by means of address terms tagged to questions or 
statements, checks, and so on: 
[7] Are you coming, David? 
[8] You’ve been here before, right? 
[9] Beg your pardon? 
By looking closely at the data, conversation analysts have, however, 
come up with a whole system of rules to effect speaker change. 
They have found that turns form units, the ends of which may act as 
places for transition. These possible completion points are called 
transition relevance places or TRPs. With this in mind, one may then 
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formulate the rules for speaker change in ongoing conversation by 
ratified speakers. They are (C = current speaker; N = next speaker): 
Rule 1  (applying at the initial TRP of any turn): 
(a) If C selects N in his current turn, then N and no other must 
speak. 
(b) If C does not select N, then any party may elect to speak, 
and the first party to do so has rights to the next turn.  
(a) If C has not selected N, and no other party self-selects under 
rule 1(b), then C may, but need not, continue.  
Rule 2  (applying at all subsequent TRPs): 
When by rule 1(c) C has assumed the right to take another turn at 
speaking, then at the next TRP rules 1(a)-1(c) re-apply, and so on 
recursively until speaker change is effected.  
 (Adapted from Levinson, 1983:298; cf. too Sacks et al., 
1974:704.)  
These “rules” are again normative, that is, orientation points or 
starting places for the collaborative lingual effort we call con-
versation. It is clear that the rules must be attended to by both S 
(speaker) and H (hearer) if they are co-operatively to accomplish a 
conversational exchange, i.e. transform an S:H relationship into a 
C:N one. 
Instances of rule 1(a) applying at the first possible completion point 
for a turn are straightforward enough. Of course, [7]-[9] above will be 
units at the end of which one may normally expect transition to N. 
But what about the operation of the other rules? We have, in other 
contexts already looked at examples of this, but another clear 
example of where self-selection occurs is marked * in the following 
exchanges (the phenomenon marked ** will be discussed below): 
[10]    A: Ih ... is ... is it this year that eh Nightingale goes? 
    B: Eh no, next year. 
   *A: Ehm sixty / f ... 
    B:  Sixty five + ... 
 **A:   Four, sixty five 
    B: Yeah. 
   *A I thought it was before sixty-five. || So it’s not until next 
year that // the job will be advertised 
  **B January I suppose there + may be an interview round 
about January. 
     A Yeah. 
  (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:38; adapted from p. 238-247.) 
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In all the turns marked * in the above, self-selection (as opposed to 
other, or C-selection) has occurred because there are no N-
selection devices present in the preceding turn, and transition takes 
place at the end (TRP) of this turn. The operation of rule 1(c) is also 
evident in A’s fourth turn (marked ||). 
The normative character of rules 1 and 2 also provides, of course, 
for their violation, as in the intentional interruption 
[11] C: Well, I wrote what I thought was a  
a ... a reason//able explanation 
 F:  I think it was a very rude letter 
   (Levinson, 1983:299.) 
which violates the provision for taking up a turn at a TRP. 
Moreover, we have, by virtue of the normative character of these 
rules, an explanation for significant silences. In [12], A’s utterances 
select B as N, but B, in initially refusing to heed rule 1(a) finally 
yields to the normative force of the rule, which is dependent on the 
connection between the lingual dimension of experience and the 
physical aspect of energy-effect, only on his last turn: 
[12] A: Is there something bothering you or not? 
   (1,0 second gap) 
 A: Yes or no? 
   (1,5 second gap) 
 A: Eh? 
 B: No. 
   (Levinson, 1983:300.) 
Apart from explaining why B’s “No” probably means “Yes”, the rules 
for achieving speaker change also clarify the sense that lingual 
subjects, as speakers, have of significant silences. Yet it is 
astonishing to see how quickly, under normative pressures for 
conversational continuity, they become so. Silences between turns 
are not tolerated in this kind of talk, and call up complaints of the 
kind 
[13] You’re not listening to me! 
[14] C: Mac 
 J: Yes 
 C: ø 
   (2 seconds) 
 J: Hey, trying to waste my time or something? 
   (Weideman et al., 1986:97.)  
Since both the fundamental rule for conversation and the rules for 
achieving change of speaker are normative, they do, as we have 
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seen, allow not only silence(s), but also overlap. The collaborative 
nature of conversation, however, provides for specific ways of 
extricating oneself from the chaos that would result if violations were 
allowed to stand without remedy. One such remedy, where overlap 
occurs, is the recycling of the part obscured by overlap, as in [2], [4] 
and [10] above (marked ** in the latter case), whereby repair is 
effected. 
Repair can also, in the case of inadvertent overlap, be called for in 
the form of a check, as in Desk’s second turn in [1], and effected by 
the subsequent turn of N. 
The existence of possible completion points for turns presents yet 
another problem not only for Ns, who have to attend to TRPs to 
avoid complaints in the form of [13], but also for Cs who for some 
reason wish to hold the floor, i.e. in formal terms, strive to avoid the 
application of rule 1(b) and to continue talking past possible 
completion points (TRPs) by rule 1(c). Thus C may employ what are 
known as incompletion markers by conversation analysts: but, and, 
however constitute devices for temporarily suspending the nor-
mative precedence of rule 1(b) over 1(c). Such markers, however, 
are only successful in avoiding application of rule 1(b) in some 
instances, as 
[15]  B: Joe has goh ... got it of course // and 
  A:  Has he + 
 *B and presumably those are the two people who do it. 
      (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:39; adapted from p. 324-327.) 
but not in others: 
[16] B: That’s what it would amount to, isn’t it, but I’d plan to get 
// somebody ... 
 A: Well he wouldn’t have to hire + somebody you see, he’d 
have you built in. 
        (Svartvik & Quirk, 1980:39; adapted from p. 299-302.) 
In fact, more than a quarter of all interruptions occur after 
conjunctions (Coulthard, 1985:64). 
Yet other incompletion markers are openings with since, if, or, more 
elaborately, 
[17] I’d like to make two comments on that. First ... Second ... 
Of course, no “incompletion marker” can guarantee that C keeps the 
turn, but they do show up N as violating the norm by interrupting, 
which may be decidedly anti-normative behaviour (see [11] above). 
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The most sophisticated solutions to the problem of C wishing to hold 
the floor occur before storytelling or jokes. These special in-
completion markers are called story-prefaces. Stories and jokes are 
often begun with 
[18] Have you heard the one about ... 
[19] There were these three girls ... 
The suspension of the rules for turn-taking by story-prefaces calls 
forth another problem for Ns, of course: how do they know that the 
floor is again open, and that the rules are in operation again? 
In the case of jokes the solution is easy, for they have recognisable 
endings, or punchlines. The laughter that is normative after the 
punchline paves the way for a resumption of rule-application. But in 
the case of stories it is of course less easy to perceive endings 
(which in their turn call for nods, comments, or both) and resumption 
of talk by rule 2. 
Thus, in probing the idea of turn-taking, ethnomethodological ana-
lysis has given us an insight into the remarkable normative system 
that helps us to distribute a factually scarce lingual resource, and 
one that is “valued” by lingual subjects – a turn at talk. 
6. A broadening of the concept of objective factual 
lingual unit 
Some of the phenomena of conversation that have been considered 
in the previous section also concern its lingual wholeness and 
continuity – specifically the continuous, sequential nature of talk that 
disallows both gaps and overlap, as well as the beginnings and 
endings of shorter and longer turns. These two concepts are related, 
respectively, to the analogies of the numerical and spatial dimen-
sions of experience within the structure of the lingual aspect. It 
should be obvious that the current discussion significantly broadens 
and opens up the constitutive notions of lingual objects, restricted as 
these are to factual units such as morphemes, words and sentences 
in “formal” linguistics, that is, in that part of linguistics that attempts 
to focus and deal exclusively with constitutive linguistic concepts, as 
these have been defined within the framework employed here. 
The conversational phenomena that were considered above were 
discussed within the context of an analysis that focused on the 
norm-side of the lingual aspect, specifically on the normative 
analogies that link the lingual aspect of our experience with the 
economic. This analysis has allowed us to conceptualise the turn-
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taking system discovered by conversation analysts in talk among 
equals as a device or norm for a shared economy of a scarce lingual 
resource. The analysis also shows that lingual subjects have an 
orientation towards mutuality in talk, and towards responding in their 
formation of lingual objects to a system of norms that allows each 
enough talking space, and the opportunity to share their expression 
– often called the “co-construction of meaning” – with selected and 
ratified others. 
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